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Abstract: A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is
shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a
broad range of discount factors, including those close to one, equilibrium is unique.
Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the
equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for
intermediate ranges of discount factors.
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1. Introduction
A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is
shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a
broad range of discount factors, including those close to one, equilibrium is unique.
Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the
equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for
intermediate ranges of discount factors.
Consider first an infinitely repeated stage-game, such as the prisoners’ dilemma,
with discounting and public randomization. A great deal is known about the structure of
sub-game perfect equilibrium payoffs as a function of the discount factor. For zero
discount factor, the equilibrium payoffs are the convex hull of static Nash payoffs, which
will be a singleton if, as in the prisoners’ dilemma, the static equilibrium is unique. As
the discount factor increases, the set of equilibrium payoffs are non-decreasing convex
sets, typically increasing in sudden jumps. If certain technical conditions are satisfied
1, as
the discount factor approaches one, the folk theorem holds: the set of equilibrium payoffs
approaches the entire individually rational socially feasible set. Even if we allow for
imperfect public information, the work of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1988] and
Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] show that this basic picture is unchanged for
perfect public equilibrium.
An important generalization of repeated games are stochastic games. Here there is
a finite collection of different states. In each state a particular stage-game is played, and
that play determines not only stage-payoffs, but also determines Markov transition
probabilities over which state occurs next. For an important class of these games,
including those in which regardless of play every state has a positive probability of being
reached in finite time, Dutta [1991] shows that the folk theorem continues to hold. As we3
shall see in this paper, monotonicity can fail, even for this class of games. However, there
are important classes of games in which irreversibility is important, that is, in which it
may be impossible when certain strategies are employed to move from one state to
another. One type of irreversibility is the existence of absorbing states. This is the case,
for example, in the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model and the war-of-attrition game,
both of which have been studied extensively. Notice, however, that both of these are folk
theorem games; this is established for the finite version of the Rubinstein-Stahl
bargaining model by Binmore, Shaked and Sutton [1985]. To see that this is the case in
the war-of-attrition, notice that a delay followed by a public randomization over one
player winning, such that each player gets (including the delay) in expected value more
than their minmax level, is in fact subgame perfect. These results, though similar to the
purely repeated case, are not as robust. In the bargaining model the folk theorem is not
robust to a continuum of actions, since in that case Rubinstein [1982] showed that there is
a unique equilibrium. In the war-of-attrition, the folk theorem fails without public
randomization. In neither case has the issue of monotonicity with public randomization
been studied.
Another class of stochastic games to which Dutta’s theorem does not apply are
games in which there are no absorbing states, but in which movement between different
states is possible only with some degree of agreement among the players. The goal of this
paper is to study a simple example of such a game, and show that these games can be
radically different than repeated games. The type of game we study is one in which
positional advantage is important, and expensive to defend. The specific example is a
two-player two-state game, which is symmetric in the sense that the role of the two
players is reversed in the two states. In each state, one player is a Lord and receives a
high utility and the other a Serf who receives a lower utility. Each player has two actions:
the Lord may defend his castle, which is costly, or not. If the castle is left undefended, the
Serf may attack the castle, which is also costly, but results in his becoming Lord in the4
following period. Notice that regardless of the state, the other state is reachable, but only
if the players agree, in the sense that the Lord fails to defend, and the Serf attacks. This
may be thought of as a useful paradigm for situations in which position has an advantage,
for example, the Lord might be a monopolist, and the Serf an innovator. Here the
monopolist must decide whether to engage in costly patenting activity that will preempt
the entrant, and prevent him from introducing an innovation that will result in the entrant
assuming the monopoly position. This example has a number of features that differentiate
it from a simple repeated game:
·  For a range of discount factors including all discount factors near one (and all
discount factors near zero) the equilibrium is unique.
·  The equilibrium for discount factors near one is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium
with discount factors near zero. Basically, for low discount factors, the Lord will not
bother to defend, nor the Serf to attack. However, for high discount factors, the Serf
will wish to attack and this forces the Lord to defend. The result is that resources are
wasted on defense.
·  For intermediate ranges of discount factors and when it is much more costly to defend
than to attack, there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is cyclic – the two
players alternate between being Lord and Serf.  It is also inefficient.
We also consider how robust these results are to introducing a small exogenous
probability that the roles are reversed regardless of play in the stage game. Here Dutta’s
conditions apply, so the folk theorem must hold for discount factors sufficiently close to
one. However, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough, then there will
still be a range of large discount factors for which there is still a unique equilibrium in
which the Lord defends and the Serf attacks. For discount factors near zero, the unique
equilibrium is still neither defense nor attack. This implies that monotonicity fails: the set
of equilibria for the large discount factors is not a superset of that for small discount
factors. Moreover, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough relative to the5
subjective interest rate, the irreversible model much more accurately captures the set of
equilibria than does the folk theorem.
2. The Castle on the Hill
In the two-player stage-game of castle on the hill, there are two player roles, that
of a Lord and that of a Serf. The Lord lives in a castle at the top of a hill, and the Serf
lives in a village beneath the hill. The Lord moves first and must choose between two
options: defending the castle or consuming. If he defends the castle the game ends, he
receives a payoff of  x d -  where d is the cost of defense, the Serf receives a payoff of 1,
and next period the Lord retains the castle. If the Lord chooses to consume he receives a
payoff of x, and the Serf must choose whether to attack the castle or consume. If he
attacks the castle the Serf receives 0. However, since the castle is not defended the attack
succeeds, so next period the role of the two players is reversed – the Serf occupies the
castle and becomes a Lord, and the Lord is exiled to the village and becomes a Serf. If,
on the other hand, the Serf chooses to consume he receives 1 and the Lord retains the












Figure 1: Extensive Form of Castle on the Hill6
Lord/Serf A C
D x d - ,1 x d - ,1
C x,0 [change roles] x,1
Figure 2: Normal Form of Castle on the Hill
In the infinitely repeated game, both players maximize average present value of utility,
and are equally patient with common discount factor 01 £< d .
We will examine the case in which it is considerably better to be Lord than Serf.
In particular we assume that it is better to be a Lord and pay double the defense cost than
it is to be a serf.
Assumption: x d -> 21 .
We will also be interested  in whether or not d >1; if so, we will say that it is more
expensive to defend than to attack.
3. Analysis of the Game
If the discount factor is zero or equivalently the game is played only once, there is
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the Serf will consume, and the Lord will consume.
In fact any Nash equilibrium results in the same utility, as it is strictly dominant for the
Lord to consume, and weakly dominant for the Serf to consume. As we shall see the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium extends to discount factors close to zero.
To put the game in the context of the folk theorem, it is useful to begin by
describing the socially feasible individually rational set. Because the game is not
repeated, the socially feasible payoff set depends on the discount factor. With public7
randomization, when the discount factor is zero, it is the triangular region shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Socially Feasible Set for d = 0
As the discount factor increases, the socially feasible payoff set (with public
randomization) is monotone, and in the limit as the discount factor approaches one, it











Figure 4: Socially Feasible Set for d ®1
By way of contrast, the minmax points depend on the state, but are independent of
the discount factor. The minmax for Lord is  x d - ; he can guarantee this amount by
defending and can be held to this by the Serf attacking. The minmax for the Serf is 1; he
can guarantee this amount by consuming and can be held to this amount by the Lord
defending.












 there is a unique Nash equilibrium: the Lord and Serf
both consume regardless of the history.







d  then there is a unique Nash equilibrium: the Lord consumes and the
Serf attacks, regardless of the history. In this case, players alternate between being Lord
and Serf.









 there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the
Lord defends and the serf attacks regardless of the history.
Proof: If the Lord consumes, he gets at least () 1-+ d d x ; if he defends now, he gets no
more than () ( ) 1-- + d d xd x . So consumption is dominant if
() () ( ) 11 -+ > - - + d d d d xx d x , or () () 11 ->- d d dx . Suppose that this is the case, so
that it is always optimal for the Lord to consume. If the Serf consumes, he gets 1. If he
attacks, then he gets at most 0, , , x x K yielding a present value of dx, and he gets no less
than 0, ,0, , x x K yielding a present value of d d x / () 1+ . So it is certainly optimal for the9
Serf to consume if 1>dx. Combining this condition, for the condition for the Lord to
consume gives (A).
On the other hand, if d d x / () 11 +>  then certainly the Serf will attack. A
necessary condition for a discount factor that satisfies this inequality together with the








This is equivalent to 21 1 dd x -< - () ; if d <1 this condition is inconsistent with
x d -> 21 , so it is necessary that d >1 and xd d >- - () / () 21 1 , which give (B).
To prove (C) recall that the minmax for Lord is x d - . Let ww LS ,  be the Lord
and Serf average present value respectively in some subgame perfect. Social feasibility
implies that wwx LS +£ + 1. Since the Lord gets at least his minmax wx d L ³- it must
be that wd S £+ 1 .
Suppose now that the Lord chooses to consume. If the Serf chooses to attack, he
gets at least d() xd - , since he will be Lord next period. If he consumes, he gets at best
() [] 11 -+ + d d d . Since d >- 12 /( ) xd , this means that it is better to attack than
consume. So in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the Serf must attack.
Turning to the Lord, if he consumes he gets at most () () 11 -++ d d xd , while he
can get at least x d - .  Since d >- - dx d /( ) 1 , he must defend.
æ
4. Robustness to Noise
How robust are these results? The condition that every state be reached with positive
probability from every other state is a generic one, so irreversibility of the type
considered here is non-generic. Suppose we consider the generic case. In particular, let us
introduce a small exogenous probability that the roles are reversed regardless of play in
the stage game. Then Dutta’s condition applies, so the folk theorem must hold for10
discount factors sufficiently close to one. However, fixing d  in any of the cases (A), (B)
or (C) above, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough, then because the
inequalities in the proof are strict, they will not be violated, and the unique equilibrium
will be unchanged and still unique. In other words, there will still be a range of large
discount factors for which there is still a unique equilibrium in which the Lord defends
and the Serf attacks. For discount factors near zero, the unique equilibrium is still neither
defense nor attack. Notice that this implies that monotonicity fails: the set of equilibria
for the large discount factors is not a superset of that for small discount factors.
Moreover, if the exogenous probability of reversal is small enough relative to the
subjective interest rate, the irreversible model much more accurately captures the set of
equilibria than does the folk theorem.11
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Figure 1: Extensive Form of Castle on the Hill14
Lord/Serf A C
D x d - ,1 x d - ,1
C x,0 [change roles] x,1
Figure 2: Normal Form of Castle on the Hill15












d  lower case latin italic dee
x  lower case latin italic ex
d  lower case greek delta
w1 lower case latin w sub one
w2 lower case latin w sub two18
Endnotes
                                                
1 See Abreu, Dutta and Smith [1992] or Fudenberg and Maskin [1986].